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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-1539
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
BRENT BIGLER,
          Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cr-00338-2)
District Judge:  Christopher C. Conner
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 3, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  May 13, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Brent Bigler seeks review of an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his “motion for clarification of the plea
agreement” into which he entered.  Bigler contends that because he had a prior agreement
2with the government that was completely separate from the ultimate plea agreement, the
District Court incorrectly determined that the prior agreement was superseded.  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction.  Therefore,
we will vacate the District Court’s order and dismiss the appeal.  In the alternative, if we
were to conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction, we would affirm its decision on
the merits.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Beginning in August 2001, Defendant Brent Bigler, Daryl Bell, and others
conspired to defraud Dentsply International (“Dentsply”).  Through an elaborate three-
year scheme involving the resale of dental equipment obtained at no charge through an
incentive program, Dentsply was defrauded out of equipment worth $1.8 million.
After being apprehended, Bigler reached a plea agreement with the government in
which he agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and a forfeiture count. 
Before reaching a final plea agreement, Bigler’s counsel mailed a letter to the government
dated March 30, 2004, which sought to memorialize an alleged agreement between the
two sides.  The agreement as described in the letter was that the money seized from the
bank account of Bigler’s shell corporation, Texas Wholesale Dental Supply, would not be
3forfeited.  Instead, the money would be counted as a voluntary transfer going towards
foreseeable restitution.
The final plea agreement, which Bigler signed and dated on October 5, 2004,
stipulated that he would forfeit $354,729 seized from the bank account of Texas
Wholesale Dental Supply, and his interest in real estate located in Plano, Texas.  In
addition, Bigler agreed to pay restitution to the victim.  Finally, the agreement contained
an integration clause that stated:  “[T]his document . . . supersedes all prior
understandings, if any, whether written or oral.”
After finalizing the plea agreement, the parties presented it to the District Court
and Bigler entered his guilty plea.  At that time, the government recited the essential
provisions of the agreement.  The District Court asked Bigler and his counsel if the
government had given an accurate summary of the plea agreement.  Bigler’s counsel
stated that the summary was accurate, but that clarification was needed regarding the
forfeiture of the Texas property.  The parties clarified the specifics of the real estate
forfeiture, which are not at issue in this appeal.  The District Court then asked again if the
summary of the plea agreement was accurate.  Bigler and his counsel both agreed that it
was, and with no objection the District Court incorporated the final order of forfeiture
into the oral pronouncement of sentence and into the judgment.
Almost a year after Bigler was sentenced on December 2, 2005, he filed a motion
for “clarification of the plea agreement” on November 30, 2006.  Relying on the
4March 30, 2004 letter from his counsel, Bigler claimed that a discrete agreement existed
and due to its completely separate nature, it was not superseded by the integration clause
in the plea agreement.  The alleged agreement was for the seized funds to count towards
restitution, and because Bigler had already provided full restitution, he argued that the
seized funds should be returned to him.  The District Court characterized Bigler’s motion
as a motion to amend the plea agreement and denied it for three reasons:  Bigler had
waived his right to contest the forfeiture, he had agreed to provide full restitution to
Dentsply, and all prior understandings had been superseded by the plea agreement.  Bigler
filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that
is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.”  Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542 (1986).  We
have “an obligation to inquire sua sponte into [our] own jurisdiction and, necessarily, into
the jurisdiction of the District Court to enter the order on appeal.”  United States v. Higgs,
504 F.3d 456, 457 (3d Cir. 2007).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Id. at
458.
If we were to conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction, analysis of the plea
agreement would be necessary.  We exercise plenary review over the interpretation and
5enforcement of a plea agreement.  See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F. 3d 540, 544-45 (3d
Cir. 2002).
III.
Bigler argues that the District Court erred when it denied his “motion for
clarification of the plea agreement” on the basis that any prior agreement was superseded
according to the integration clause of the plea agreement.  The government contends that
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his motion.  Even if jurisdiction
did exist, the government argues, no separate agreement existed and any such agreement
would have been superseded by the integration clause.
After examining the purpose of Bigler’s “motion for clarification of the plea
agreement,” as well as the text of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and controlling
precedent, we conclude that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over Bigler’s
motion.  In the alternative, if the District Court had jurisdiction, we would affirm its
denial of Bigler’s motion.
A.
In his motion, Bigler sought to have the money seized by the government applied
to his restitution instead of being treated as a forfeiture.  The District Court described
Bigler’s motion as a “motion to amend the plea agreement” without specifically noting
under which Rule of Criminal Procedure the motion had been filed.
6The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the requirements for filing a
motion to correct a sentence:  “Within 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”  FED. R. CRIM. P.
35(a).  We have concluded that this seven-day time limit is jurisdictional, because it is
based on a statute.  Higgs, 504 F.3d at 464.  Therefore, assuming that Bigler’s motion was
a Rule 35(a) motion, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it because it was
filed well beyond seven days after sentencing.
In Higgs, the defendant filed his Rule 35(a) motion within the seven-day time
limit, but the District Court did not rule on his motion until after the seven days had
passed.  Id. at 458-59.  We determined that the defendant’s motion must be filed within
the seven days, and in addition, the District Court must rule on the motion within the
seven-day time limit.  Id.  In deciding whether the seven-day limit was jurisdictional, we
noted that the Supreme Court case of Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007), was
controlling.  Higgs, 504 F.3d at 464.  In Bowles, the Supreme Court explained that “if a
time limitation is set forth in a statute, it is jurisdictional.”  Id.  We concluded that the
Rule 35 seven-day time period “derives from the limitation set forth by statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c).”  Id.  Therefore, we determined that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear Higgs’s Rule 35 motion; we vacated the order denying the motion and dismissed the
appeal.  Id.
7In this case, Bigler did not file his Rule 35 motion until nearly a year after his
sentencing.  This means, of course, that neither the motion nor the District Court’s ruling
were within the Rule 35 seven-day time frame.  As we determined in Higgs, the
seven-day time frame is jurisdictional, so the District Court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain Bigler’s motion.  Higgs dictates that we must vacate the District Court’s denial
of the motion and dismiss the appeal.  Id. at 465.
B.
In the alternative, Bigler’s “motion for clarification of the plea agreement” could
have been construed as a Rule 36 motion.  Rule 36 provides that “the court may at any
time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an
error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.
Thus, if Bigler’s motion had been construed as a request for the District Court to
correct an error under Rule 36, the Court was free to do so “at any time.”  Id. 
Considering the substance of the District Court’s order denying the motion, we conclude
that if the District Court had possessed jurisdiction, its denial of relief would have been
proper.
Principles of contract law govern the interpretation of plea agreements, and both
the defendant and the government are bound by the terms of the agreement.  United States
v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Butler, 297 F.3d
505, 513 n.8 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n integration clause normally prevents a criminal
8defendant, who has entered into a plea agreement, from asserting that the government
made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself.”).  In this case,
Bigler was bound by the following terms of the plea agreement:  (1) his agreement to
forfeit the funds, (2) his agreement to make restitution, and (3) the integration clause
specifying that the plea agreement superseded any other agreements.
In addition, the March 30, 2004 letter from Bigler’s counsel to the government
shows only Bigler’s position with regard to the plea negotiations.  In the absence of any
response from the government, the letter does not demonstrate an understanding between
the two sides.  Therefore, Bigler’s argument about the alleged separate agreement lacks
merit.
IV.
If we had concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction, we would have
affirmed its decision.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that it did not have
jurisdiction.  Therefore, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Bigler’s motion
and dismiss the appeal.
